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SANCTIFICATION, SATISFACTION,  
AND THE PURPOSE OF PURGATORY
Neal Judisch
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the doctrine of purgatory 
among Christian philosophers. Some of these philosophers argue for the ex-
istence of purgatory from principles consistent with historic Protestant the-
ology and then attempt, on the basis of those principles, to formulate a dis-
tinctively Protestant view of purgatory—i.e., one that differs essentially from 
the Catholic doctrine as regards purgatory’s raison d’etre. Here I aim to show 
that Protestant models of purgatory which are grounded in the necessity of 
becoming fully sanctified before entering heaven (Sanctification Models) fail to 
contrast materially with the Catholic model of purgatory, which has histori-
cally been formulated in terms of the necessity of making satisfaction for sins 
already forgiven (The Satisfaction Model). Indeed, I shall argue that contrary to 
widespread assumption, the Sanctification Model and the Satisfaction Model 
are equivalent when the latter is properly understood.
Purgatory is the process of purification for those who die 
in the love of God but who are not completely imbued 
with that love. Sacred Scripture teaches us that we must be 
purified if we are to enter into perfect and complete union 
with God. Jesus Christ, who became the perfect expiation 
for our sins and took upon himself the punishment that 
was our due, brings us God’s mercy and love. But before 
we enter into God’s Kingdom every trace of sin within us 
must be eliminated, every imperfection in our soul must be 
corrected. This is exactly what takes place in Purgatory.
—John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday, 4 August 1999
A man is punished by the very things through which he sins.
—Wis 11.16
I. Introduction
Among the few encouraging developments on the ecumenical frontier 
in recent years is the noteworthy warming of Protestant sensibilities to 
the idea of purgatory, understood as an intermediate postmortem state in 
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which souls destined for heaven are purified or made fit for heavenly life.1 
Belief in purgatory has of course been a mainstay of Catholic (but not of 
Protestant) theology for centuries, and Catholics, true to form, are none 
too likely to give it up. So to the extent that Catholics and Protestants can 
manage to achieve agreement on the reality of an intermediate purgatorial 
state, this achievement may be welcomed by the ecumenically-minded as 
a piece of genuine progress.
That’s the good news. The bad news is that the arguments for purga-
tory which have been advanced by at least some Protestants who affirm its 
existence make clear how little this otherwise encouraging development 
must result from any authentic increase in appreciation as to where the 
relevant points of disagreement (and agreement) between Catholics and 
Protestants actually lie. Specifically, it is clear that the arguments in ques-
tion were formulated with the express intent of avoiding certain perceived 
errors and abuses which have long been associated with the Catholic theory 
of purgatory—theological muddles which, according to these Protestant 
purgatory proponents, supply the Catholic doctrine of purgatory with its 
theoretical underpinning and motivational force—but which in fact betray 
a misconception of what the Catholic theory is. On this view of things, the 
Catholic doctrine had its genesis and finds its nourishment in a conception 
of salvation according to which a person is put right with God more or less 
as a result of their own good works and meritorious efforts, in contrast to 
the Protestant view which specifies that a person’s right standing before 
God is entirely a matter of grace, gratuitously applied to the individual 
who puts his faith in the meritorious achievements of Christ. This per-
ceived difference between Catholicism and Protestantism is then carried 
over and reflected in the function assigned to purgatory, or the purpose it 
is thought to serve, within these contrasting soteriological schemes: on the 
Protestant version purgatory exists so that the heaven-bound individual 
who requires postmortem sanctification may complete the process of be-
ing made intrinsically holy (as distinguished from being ‘reckoned’ holy 
before the divine tribunal on account of an imputed righteousness not 
inherently possessed) prior to entering into the glories of heaven, whereas 
the Catholic version has it that the heaven-bound individual who has not, 
at the time of death, made up for all the debts he has accumulated through 
his sins must suffer postmortem punishment with a view toward making 
satisfaction for them; this individual may then “enter into the joy of his 
Lord” (Matthew 25.21), but only after his Lord, by way of preparation for 
the joyous homecoming, has exacted an appropriately agonizing amount 
of vengeance upon him for a suitable stretch of time.
1See Justin D. Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” Faith 
and Philosophy 24 (2007), pp. 311–330; David Vander Laan, “The Sanctification Ar-
gument for Purgatory,” Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), pp. 331–339; Jerry Walls, 
Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (New York: Oxford UP, 2002), and Hell: The Logic of 
Damnation (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1992); David Brown, “No Heaven 
Without Purgatory,” Religious Studies 21 (1985), pp. 447–456; and John Hick, Death 
and Eternal Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1976). C. S. Lewis’s discussion of pur-
gatory, in his Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer (Harcourt Brace & Co, 1964), pp. 
106–111, is also frequently cited in this connection.
SanCtifiCation, SatiSfaCtion, and Purgatory 169
Such appears to be the general picture. So, to take a recent example 
from this Journal, one philosopher who operates within the mindset just 
described contends that the difference between his view of purgatory, 
which is targeted at the completion of the sanctification process, and the 
Catholic view, which focuses on satisfaction for sins, is that the former 
“is forward looking in that its purpose is to provide an occasion for the 
fulfillment of a future aim” (viz. intrinsic, personal holiness), whereas the 
latter “is backward-looking as its purpose is to provide an occasion for the 
remission of past failures.”2 To put it in other terms, the Protestant version 
is aimed at ‘purging’ the “disposition to sin” which remains in the incom-
pletely sanctified believer even though the penalty for his sins was paid in 
toto by Christ, while the Catholic version is aimed at ‘purging’ “the penalty 
for sin or sin itself” as opposed to the sinful disposition.3 This difference 
of purpose is then understood, in turn, to be an inevitable outworking of 
the fundamentally contrastive soteriological orientations of Catholicism 
and Protestantism: in effect, Protestants think that Jesus paid the penalty 
for our sins, but Catholics don’t think that. Accordingly, it’s no surprise 
that since the Catholic view of purgatory requires the individual to make 
satisfaction for his own failures, it “undermines the sufficiency of Christ’s 
work as a satisfaction for sin” and indeed “renders Christ’s work superflu-
ous,” whereas the “Sanctification Model of purgatory does not undermine 
the sufficiency of Christ’s work as a satisfaction for sin” and therefore “al-
leviates at least one standard objection that Protestants might have against 
purgatory.”4 Thus reassured, Protestants may in good faith avail them-
selves of the notion of purgatory and all the theoretical benefits pertaining 
thereto, for even if the Catholic view of purgatory is “fundamentally in-
compatible with Protestantism” as regards the sufficiency (and, it would 
seem, the overall non-superfluity) of Christ’s atoning sacrifice, it doesn’t 
follow that every version of purgatory likewise renders “Christ’s salvific 
work pointless”5 or otherwise conflicts with any given “cornerstone of 
Protestant theology.”6
It seems to me reasonably safe to infer from remarks like these that 
whatever exactly a Protestant / Catholic consensus on the existence of pur-
gatory might suggest in the abstract, in this case it appears to represent 
nothing more than the mutual affirmation of a comparatively tangential 
doctrine to which both parties have arrived in wildly different ways and 
for irreconcilably opposed reasons. Thus the real agreement concerning 
the necessity of purgatory (for at least a large class of individuals) turns 
out simply to highlight the radical underlying rift between Catholic and 
Protestant thought generally, a rift which looks to remain as unbridgeable 
as ever. In this essay I would like to make one very small contribution to 
the ecumenical effort by showing that the Protestant version of purgatory 
just introduced is equivalent to the Catholic one. For ease of reference I 
2Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” p. 326.
3Ibid., p. 326, my emphasis.
4Ibid., pp. 326–327.
5Ibid., p. 325.
6Ibid., p. 329, n. 7.
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shall continue to refer to the Protestant conception and the Catholic con-
ception as the Sanctification Model and the Satisfaction Model respec-
tively. Thus my thesis may be rephrased as expressing the contention that 
the Satisfaction Model and the Sanctification Model amount to the same 
thing, so long as the Satisfaction Model is appropriately understood. To 
put it another, slightly less ambitious-sounding way, I aim to show that 
the Catholic doctrine of purgatory not only permissibly can but in fact 
should be understood as equivalent to the Sanctification Model of purga-
tory. Whether every individual Catholic over the past two millennia has 
understood the doctrine in precisely this way is, of course, another matter 
entirely; but so far as I can see the answer to this question (which is almost 
certainly “No”) is neither here nor there. For present purposes I shall sim-
ply take my cues from the official teaching of the Catholic Church and—to 
allay any suspicions that my own interpretation of the Catholic position 
is sneaky or idiosyncratic or excessively charitable or just plain “made 
up”—I shall also appeal periodically to figures who can reasonably be 
regarded as possessing a measure of representational authority within the 
world of Catholicism. (Popes, for instance.) I begin with what I take to be 
the common ground between Christians, of whatever stripe, who believe 
in the reality of purgatory.
II. Why Purgatory?
Answers to this question vary, but the common thread running through-
out the range of available responses is simply that (i) gracious pardon for 
sins notwithstanding, we cannot enter into and enjoy full union with God 
without being completely and finally liberated from the influence or ‘do-
minion’ of sin and made intrinsically pure and unwaveringly upright of 
heart; yet (ii) hardly anybody we’ve heard of ever attains that degree of 
holiness before they die and frankly, to judge by the look of things, we 
probably aren’t going to either; but since (iii) God cannot simply ‘zap’ us 
with a sanctifying ray and unilaterally bestow a radically altered nature 
upon us all in one go, it had better be the case that (iv) there is some kind of 
postmortem process, or state of being, whereby we are at last transformed 
into the sorts of creatures who can enter into and ceaselessly celebrate that 
perfect and eternal union with God held out to us in the life of the world 
to come.
Some readers will no doubt wish to see a fuller defense of the assumption 
in (iii); why can’t God unilaterally perfect us at the point of death, making 
up for what we lack in the way of sanctification by sheer divine fiat? And 
here again the reasons provided vary. According to some philosophers, 
an externally imposed operation which consists in the instant and irrevo-
cable transformation of our natures to the level of perfection required for 
heavenly life would simply be too profound and sudden a change for any 
of us to survive. Maybe it isn’t such a stretch to imagine St Francis getting 
through the ordeal more or less intact, but the rest of us would hardly 
recognize ourselves. And the intuition here is that we wouldn’t recognize 
ourselves because we wouldn’t be ourselves: the medicine couldn’t come 
in that heavy a dose without killing the patient, so to speak, so not even 
God could renovate us so radically in one fell swoop and simultaneously 
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preserve the sort of continuity required for personal identity through the 
envisioned metamorphosis.7 Others contend that even if such externally 
induced sanctification could occur without God’s violating a person’s per-
sistence conditions, there must be morally sufficient reasons for Him not to 
do it. For if we concede that God could carry out this kind of operation at 
the point of death without contravening any moral principles or prevent-
ing any valuable state of affairs which would otherwise have obtained, 
then we have to face the question why God doesn’t just perform this feat 
right now, right here in this life. Yet (so the argument runs) to the ex-
tent that we cannot answer this question, we compromise our strategic 
posture vis-à-vis the argument from evil, since if God could unilaterally 
sanctify us at death without preventing any greater good—say, the good of 
a gradually sanctified nature brought about through the cooperative inter-
play between divine grace and significant human freedom—then there’s 
no obvious reason why He couldn’t eliminate all the post-conversion evil 
we bring about by just cutting to the chase and unilaterally sanctifying 
us here and now. So if God could do this but refrained from doing it, 
He’d be guilty of allowing all sorts of evil which could be “properly elimi-
nated,” or which He could prevent without introducing a greater evil or 
averting a greater good, in which case we’d have no reply to the atheist’s 
insistence that this is exactly what God would do if He really were ev-
erything traditional theism imagines Him to be.8 And finally, in a similar 
vein, others have argued that any teleological theodicy which stresses the 
process of growth towards a moral and spiritual ideal as being essential to 
the genuine realization of this ideal (John Hick’s ‘soul-making’ approach 
is an example) must likewise have recourse to a purgatorial state, since 
an impeccably sanctified character bestowed from without at the time of 
death, as opposed to an increasingly sanctified character which continues 
to be developed after death from within, would short-circuit the authentic 
maturation of the soul and therefore undermine the justification for evil 
proposed by the theodicy.9
7This is the argument advanced by David Brown in “No Heaven Without Pur-
gatory.”
8Justin Barnard formulates this argument in “Purgatory and the Dilemma of 
Sanctification.”
9Thus according to Michael Stoeber, unless we are prepared to endorse the twin 
theses of karma and retributive rebirth as set forth in the Hindu tradition (which 
Stoeber himself considers to be the wisest course), then we must instead appeal 
to a purgatorial realm, understood as a state in which the unfinished growth 
and maturation of the individual may be remedied. Such a state, he argues, is “a 
necessary supposition of teleological theodicy” when we reflect on the suffering 
and death of innocent children in particular, for if “the tortured child is removed 
from the teleological scheme without the chance to realise the telos that justifies 
moral and natural evils of the world, then that theodicy fails. To suggest that the 
child simply passes away is to deny divine goodness. To suppose that the child is 
granted eternal life is to render divine providence arbitrary or elitist. And, in any 
case, both proposals imply that evil cannot be fully explained in terms of the tele-
ology” (Evil and the Mystic’s God: Towards a Mystical Theodicy [University of Toronto 
Press, 1992], p. 169). See also John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Harper, 1978). 
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On the whole I think each of these arguments for (iii) has something 
to commend it. Since my aim here is less to establish purgatory’s exis-
tence and more to reconcile two allegedly rival conceptions of it, how-
ever, I shall forego any detailed discussion of them and take the reality 
of purgatory for granted. Supposing then we grant arguendo that belief 
in purgatory is sufficiently well motivated for Catholics and Protestants 
alike, we should take a moment to make explicit the function assigned 
to purgatory according to (iv); and to this end it will be useful to borrow 
two terms10 from Justin Barnard, the philosopher upon whom I relied 
to represent the Sanctification Model approach above. Let us say that a 
person S is ‘lapsable’ iff S possesses saving faith11 in Christ and S does 
not (yet) possess a thoroughly sanctified nature; and let’s call a person S 
‘sanctified’ iff S possesses saving faith in Christ and also possesses a thor-
oughly sanctified nature. To say that S possesses a thoroughly sanctified 
nature is to say that S cannot sin, that S’s character and dispositions are 
‘fixed’ in such a way that under no nomologically possible circumstances 
would S commit evil. Putting the same thing more positively, S’s will is 
one in purpose and holiness with the will of God. His character exempli-
fies the quality medieval theologians termed impeccability, the character-
istic feature of the redeemed in heaven who, according to St Augustine, 
have attained to that “truer” and “superior” kind of freedom (modeled 
upon God’s) which involves both the ability to not sin—an ability we 
haven’t really enjoyed since Adam’s fall—and the inability to sin—an in-
ability we’ve never enjoyed at all.12 Thus the sanctified may be thought 
of as possessing a kind of moral libertas which mirrors the divine free-
dom, a state of being which St Augustine construes as a heavenly reward, 
whereas the lapsable are destined to but have not yet attained this moral 
perfection of their natures.
So finally, with all this in place, we can say that the exclusive object of 
purgatory according to the Sanctification Model is the transformation of the 
lapsable into the sanctified: by itself, saving faith is necessary for getting into 
purgatory and sufficient for avoiding hell; being lapsable is necessary and 
sufficient for getting into purgatory; and being sanctified is necessary and 
sufficient for getting out of purgatory (or in rare cases just skipping it alto-
gether) and getting into heaven. Purgation is thus the means by which the 
Christian’s inherent moral condition “catches up” to his unpenalizable status, 
purchased by Christ, before the tribunal of God. That is what the Sanctifi-
cation Model says.
10Actually, two more. I have borrowed ‘Sanctification Model’ and ‘Satisfaction 
Model’ from him as well.
11Here I understand ‘saving faith’ to be whatever sort of faith it is that distin-
guishes the elect from those devils who “believe and tremble” (Jas 2.19). I take it 
that such faith is identical to the ‘faith working through love’ (fides quae per dilectio-
nem operatur) of which St Augustine spoke in his on grace and free Will 18–20, but 
nothing in my argument hangs on this particular formulation of it.
12See St Augustine, City of god XXII.30. For a very enjoyable overview of the 
medieval discussion concerning the freedom and impeccability of the saints, see 
Simon Francis Gaine, Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? Freedom, Impeccability and 
Beautitude (T&T Clark: Continuum, 2003).
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III. Sins and Satisfactions
We know, then, that there is nothing sinful about the sanctified as regards 
their characters or dispositions: they love God and neighbor with all their 
hearts as a matter of routine. And since Jesus made satisfaction for the 
sins they had committed prior to becoming sanctified, there is nothing 
‘categorically’ or ‘legally’ bad about them either, in the sense that they bear 
no guilt for all the wrongs they have done and are in consequence subject 
to no retributive punishment. Now the Satisfaction Model of purgatory as 
sketched above is consistent with this description of those who have gone 
through purgatory as being both inherently and legally upright—as hav-
ing been ‘purged’ both of the “disposition to sin” and of “the penalty for sin 
or sin itself”—but even if the end result of purgation on the Satisfaction 
Model is consistent with the ultimate result according to the Sanctification 
Model, the purpose of purgation on the Satisfaction approach evidently 
isn’t the “forward looking” one of producing sanctified individuals, but 
appears primarily to involve the “backward looking” aspect of meting out 
retributive punishments and penalties for the wrongs they have done.
Indeed, when we reflect that Barnard’s description of the Satisfaction 
Model fails to include the suggestion that any sanctification might be tak-
ing place in purgatory at all, it is tempting to conclude that the latter aspect 
(the retributive punishment bit) is really the main point, maybe even the 
sole point, of purgatory on a Catholic view of things. Thus Barnard: “Ac-
cording to the Satisfaction Model, purgatory is a temporal state of existence 
after death the purpose of which is to make satisfaction (i.e., payment) for 
sins committed on earth for which sufficient satisfaction was not rendered 
by the time of death.”13 Nor is the assumption Barnard voices here peculiar 
to him. For example, after quoting the relevant portion from the Council 
of Florence (1439), which specifies that “if truly penitent people die in the 
love of God before they have made satisfaction for acts and omissions by 
worthy fruits of repentance, their souls are cleansed after death by cleans-
ing pains,”14 Michael Stoeber concludes,
From the official Vatican standpoint, then, purgatory is understood 
as a realm of physical or mental punishment, more in negative terms 
of painful retribution than in positive conceptions of spiritual learn-
ing and growth. Indeed, though the latter function is not ruled out in 
the traditional formulation, there is the sense that one can ‘burn off,’ 
as it were, the actions and effects of past moral improprieties, simply 
through passive suffering.15
And the mere passive suffering of painful retribution, of course, hardly 
suggests that any spiritual learning and growth are in view here at all; 
what it does appear to suggest, and what it has strongly suggested to Bar-
nard at any rate, is that Calvin’s classification of the Catholic conception 
of purgatory as a “horrid blasphemy” and a “deadly device of Satan” 
13Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” p. 325.
14Ecumenical Council of Florence, Session 6.
15Stoeber, Evil and the Mystic’s God, p. 167.
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“seems fitting from the perspective of Protestant theology,” inasmuch as 
Protestant theology protests that Christ’s satisfaction for sin isn’t simply 
empty or fictitious.16
Over against this assessment of the Catholic position stands the Catho-
lic position’s assessment of itself. And as far as I can tell, this latter as-
sessment makes it tolerably clear that the “official Vatican standpoint” is 
similar indeed to the official Barnardian one. In a nutshell, the Catholic 
doctrine says that (1) the sins of Christians have been forgiven in virtue of 
the satisfaction rendered for them by Christ, and that (2) as a consequence, 
they will not suffer ‘eternal punishment’ for their sins. It then adds to this 
the provisos that (3) insofar as there remain ‘temporal punishments’ at-
tached to sins for which these Christians themselves must ‘make satisfac-
tion,’ it follows that (4) if they have not ‘made satisfaction’ for these sins 
prior to death then they’ve got to go through purgatory. Now when the 
Catholic doctrine says all this, the statements in (1) and (2) should be taken 
as stating that Christians will suffer no ‘legal’ penalty for their sins because 
Christ took the punishment for those sins upon Himself so as to secure 
their forgiveness, and the provisos in (3) and (4) should be understood as 
specifying the need for lapsable Christians to undergo a purgative regimen 
aimed at the rehabilitation or restoration of their spiritual health. That is, the 
Catholic doctrine of purgatory says that purgatory is for Christians who, 
despite the cancellation of their ‘legal’ penalties before God, still need to 
become thoroughly sanctified.
Admittedly, the terminological devices involved in this formulation tend 
to invite misgiving. But the juridical / legal language in which the doctrine is 
cast is simply the characteristic mode of expression that the Western tradi-
tion, both Catholic and Protestant, has historically used to get across what-
ever it’s trying to say. Doubtless this mode of expression can be misleading 
and at times does more harm than good (in fact the case before us seems a 
promising candidate for one of those times), but however that may be there 
is no question that the vision of purgatory expounded here is one with 
which Protestants (and Eastern Orthodox, too) should be perfectly happy.17 
To see this, however, one must first appreciate how terms like ‘satisfaction’ 
and ‘temporal punishment’ are being deployed by those who use them 
to describe what’s going on in purgatory. And in order to get straight on 
these terms, it is of first importance to recognize that according to Catholic 
16Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” p. 326.
17With respect to the proper interpretation of the Catholic dogma it is worth 
bearing in mind, as Linda Zagzebski (“Purgatory,” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy [New York: Routledge, 1998], p. 838) has noted, that when the official 
teaching on purgatory was first hammered out at the Councils of Lyons (1274) 
and Florence (1439) it was done “with the intent of reconciling the Greek Chris-
tians,” who objected to much of what the legal and penal language in which the 
dogma is formulated tends prima facie to suggest. Given that the Eastern Orthodox 
mode of theological expression is much more ‘organic’ or ‘natural’ than ‘legal’ or 
‘juridical’—e.g., salvation understood in terms of deification as opposed to justifica-
tion, purgatory seen as a process of growth and maturation as opposed to satisfaction 
and punishment, etc.—it seems reasonable to believe that the Catholic participants 
would not lightly have aggravated Greek sensibilities with respect to the content of 
the doctrine of purgatory being propounded.
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thought sin has a “double consequence” which corresponds to two distinct 
kinds of punishment for sin. That is to say, a given sinful action or omission 
must be thought of as resulting in two kinds of consequence, and corre-
sponding to each kind of consequence is a particular form of punishment 
appropriate to it. As regards the first consequence of sin—or, if you prefer, 
the first aspect of the “double consequence” of sin; I take these expressions 
to be synonymous—sin “deprives us of communion with God” which in 
turn “makes us incapable of eternal life;” and the “privation” of eternal life 
“is called the ‘eternal punishment’ of sin.”18 Thus we can see that the first 
consequence of sin is to be identified with the deprivation of the sinner’s 
communion with God, and the punishment attending this consequence of 
sin is the sinner’s exclusion from eternal life: i.e., his consignment to the 
eternal punishment of sin, or ‘hell.’ Now this ‘eternal punishment,’ which 
is one of the two consequences of sin, should be understood as correspond-
ing to what Barnard has in mind when he speaks of the “penalty for sin.” 
In other words, this consequence of sin relates to the ‘legal’ debt we owe to 
God and for which, as St Anselm insisted in Cur deus Homo, only a person 
who is both God and Man could make a satisfaction acceptable to divine 
justice.19 It follows, then, that we ourselves cannot make satisfaction for 
this consequence of sin (i.e., we cannot ‘purge’ the “penalty for sin or sin 
itself”) on the Catholic view; for that is a work of Christ only. And when 
we appropriate the satisfaction Christ made on our behalf by repenting 
and putting our faith in Him we receive “forgiveness of sin and restora-
tion of communion with God,” which, in consequence, releases us from the 
obligation to pay the penalty for our sins and entails that we are no longer 
deprived or “made incapable of” of eternal life.20
So far so good. But recall that there is a second consequence of sin in 
addition to the one above. For although forgiveness of sins and restora-
tion of communion with God together “entail the remission of the eternal 
punishment of sin,” the “temporal punishment of sin remains”—and it is 
of course the ‘temporal punishment’ for which we are expected to ‘make 
satisfaction,’ either in this life or in the purgatorial fires of the next.21 Now, 
this element of the current approach will likely be regarded as render-
ing the Satisfaction Model flatly and irredeemably incompatible with the 
Sanctification Model, since it may easily sound as though it takes back 
from us with one hand what it had given us with the other—Jesus made 
satisfaction for sins, it assures us, but for some reason or other, it goes on 
to say, we’ve got to make our own satisfaction anyhow; and that is pre-
cisely the suggestion proponents of the Sanctification Model are eager to 
repudiate. Yet to charge the Satisfaction Model with doublespeak on this 
point would be to ignore the fact that the ‘temporal punishment’ for sin 
really does correspond to a distinct consequence of sin and that this conse-
quence is entirely different from the first one, the one that corresponds to 
the ‘eternal punishment’ of sin described above.
18Catechism of the Catholic Church §1472, emphasis in original; cf. §§1849–1850.
19St Anselm, Cur deus Homo I.11–15, 19–25. Cf. St Thomas, Summa Theologica, III, 
q. 48 art. 2, 4; q. 49 art. 3; q. 68 art. 5 and see also §§601–615 of the Catechism.
20Catechism §1473.
21Ibid.
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In reality, the second consequence of sin simply isn’t about legal ‘pen-
alties’ which need to be ‘settled’ in the divine law court or accumulated 
‘debts’ for which the sinner must make ‘payment’; nor is the ‘temporal 
punishment’ corresponding to this consequence a matter of vindictive 
‘retribution’ externally imposed by God the Judge upon hapless, pas-
sively suffering sinners; nor, finally, is the ‘satisfaction’ required of such 
sinners a matter of accruing enough merit to balance out their demerits 
or, alternatively, just gritting their teeth and letting God extract His pound 
of flesh. Rather, the consequence of sin which issues in ‘temporal punish-
ment’ is identical to the corrosive effect of sin itself upon the individual’s 
soul; the ‘temporal punishment’ of this consequence, accordingly, consists 
in the individual’s enduring through and struggling to rectify the disorder of 
his soul and spiritual ill health that sinful behavior brings in its wake; and, 
finally, ‘making satisfaction’ for sins, in this context, is to be understood as 
the individual’s doing whatever is required (and allowing God to do to him 
whatever’s required) to restore his spiritual well-being and so to be ‘purged’ 
of his self-destructive attachment to sin. To put it another way, sinfulness—the 
self-reinforcing urge to commit iniquity introduced through original sin 
and fostered by the habitual exercise of our capacity for it, or what the 
tradition simply calls ‘concupiscence’—just is the second consequence of 
sin, the ‘temporal punishment’ for which sinners must suffer here or in 
purgatory. It is not some additional ‘judicial’ penalty God imposes on sin-
ners from on high with the expectation of their finding a way, somehow or 
other, to ‘make satisfaction’ in the form of ‘payment’ for their debts; it is, as 
it were, the ‘natural’ punishment sin itself brings upon those who commit 
it, rather as virtue is said to bring with it its own reward.
Once these clarifications are grasped and held firmly in mind, it should 
be perfectly obvious that the model of purgatory expounded in the rel-
evant sections of the Catechism of the Catholic Church is straightforwardly 
equivalent to the Sanctification Model, not something that stands in sworn 
opposition to it. Notice, for example, that it is precisely the “unhealthy 
attachment to creatures” (i.e., a sinful disposition) which is said to result 
from sin and issue in “temporal punishment” for it, and, moreover, that 
purgatory is identified as the process by which the individual is purified 
from such attachment:
To understand this doctrine and practice of the Church, it is neces-
sary to understand that sin has a double consequence. Grave sin de-
prives us of communion with God and therefore makes us incapable 
of eternal life, the privation of which is called the “eternal punish-
ment” of sin. On the other hand every sin, even venial, entails an 
unhealthy attachment to creatures, which must be purified either 
here on earth, or after death in the state called Purgatory. This pu-
rification frees one from what is called the “temporal punishment” 
of sin.22
Further, the notion that the ‘temporal punishment’ suffered in purgatory 
is some sort of “backward looking” retribution God extracts from indi-
22Catechism §1472, emphasis in original.
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viduals in view of their “past failures” is explicitly repudiated, since the 
punishment in question “must not be conceived of as a kind of vengeance 
inflicted by God from without, but as following from the very nature of 
sin.”23 And it follows from the nature of sin because sin doesn’t only harm 
the person against whom it is perpetrated or amass a whole ton of debt 
before God or whatever, it “also injures and weakens the sinner himself, 
as well as his relationships with God and neighbor”24 because it “creates 
a proclivity to sin; it engenders vice by repetition of the same acts [and] 
results in perverse inclinations which cloud conscience and corrupt the 
concrete judgment of good and evil,” which in turn explains why “sin 
tends to reproduce itself and reinforce itself.”25 Thus although “Absolu-
tion takes away sin”—i.e., although it removes what Barnard calls the 
“penalty for sin or sin itself”—receiving this forgiveness “does not remedy 
all the disorders sin has caused”—i.e., it doesn’t automatically eliminate 
what Barnard calls the person’s “disposition to sin.” Consequently, once he 
has been “Raised up from sin [i.e., forgiven], the sinner must still recover 
his full spiritual health by doing something more to make amends for the 
sin: he must ‘make satisfaction for’ or ‘expiate’ his sins,” an activity which 
“is also called ‘penance.’”26 And if his “full spiritual health” hasn’t been 
recovered by the time he dies, then he’s going to have to keep on ‘making 
satisfaction’ and ‘doing penance’ right through the fires of purgatory until 
he gets it back.
So all of this talk about “satisfaction” and “expiation” and “suffering” 
and “penance” and the like does not refer to the poor soul’s attempt to ap-
pease the fury of God by offering itself up as an object of divine vengeance; 
it is aimed precisely at the “forward looking” goal of the transformation of 
the “old man” into the “new man”—in other words, at the conversion of 
the lapsable into the sanctified:
The forgiveness of sin and restoration of communion with God entail 
the remission of the eternal punishment of sin, but temporal punish-
ment of sin remains. While patiently bearing sufferings and trials of 
all kinds and, when the day comes, serenely facing death, the Chris-
tian must strive to accept this temporal punishment of sin as a grace. 
He should strive by works of mercy and charity, as well as by prayer 
23Ibid.
24Catechism §1459.
25Catechism §1865.
26Catechism §1459. Compare also St Thomas’s endorsement and explanation of 
the definition of satisfaction according to which “satisfaction is to uproot the causes 
of sins, and to give no opening to the suggestions thereof” in the Summa Theologica, 
Supp. III, q. 12 art. 3 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province): “By ‘causes’ we 
must understand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the 
lust of sin through the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things 
which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of sin, such as 
place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed by satisfaction in this 
life, albeit the ‘fomes’ [i.e., the ‘fuel’ of concupiscence, the effect of original sin], 
which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in 
this life though it is weakened.”
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and the various practices of penance, to put off completely the “old 
man” and to put on the “new man.”27
And this is why, finally, the kind of “conversion which proceeds from a 
fervent charity can attain the complete purification of the sinner in such a 
way that no punishment would remain,” since such a comprehensive and 
profound perfection of the entire life’s effort toward conversio, or reorienta-
tion toward God and away from sin, signals the end “of the struggle . . . 
directed toward holiness and eternal life” whereby the Christian “seeks 
to purify himself of his sin and to become holy with the help of God’s 
grace.”28 But to be purified and to become holy with the help of God’s 
grace is of course equivalent to successfully consummating the sanctifica-
tion process; and whenever that process has come to completion ‘temporal 
punishment’ naturally has no further application, since the whole telos of 
‘temporal punishment’ is to spur us onward toward precisely this goal.
Putting it all together, it follows that the exclusive object of purgatory ac-
cording to the Satisfaction Model is to allow those who die in the love 
of God to suffer the ‘temporal punishments’ and ‘make satisfaction’ for sins, 
where this in turn is strictly equated with the process whereby the forgiven-
but-lapsable individual is purified of his disposition to sin and made inherently 
holy. Therefore, by itself saving faith is necessary for getting into purgatory 
and sufficient for avoiding hell; being lapsable is necessary and sufficient 
for getting into purgatory; and being sanctified is necessary and sufficient 
for getting out of purgatory (or in rare cases simply giving it a pass) and 
getting into heaven. In other words: the Satisfaction Model is equivalent 
to the Sanctification Model.
There is a prettier and somewhat less cumbersome and distracting 
way the same thing could be said. According to the Satisfaction Model 
à la Pope Benedict XVI, for example, the tripartite division of hell, pur-
gatory and heaven maps neatly onto what may be considered the three 
potential spiritual states of an individual at death. At one extreme lies 
the frightful possibility of persons who have “totally destroyed their de-
sire for truth and readiness to love” and “who have lived for hatred and 
have suppressed all love within themselves” to the point that the destruc-
tion of the good within them is “irrevocable,” which leaves them simply 
“beyond remedy.” That’s “what we mean by the word Hell.” At the other 
extreme stand the sanctified, “who are utterly pure, completely perme-
ated by God, and thus fully open to their neighbours—people for whom 
communion with God even now gives direction to their entire being and 
whose journey towards God only brings to fulfillment what they already 
are.” This is the group of persons who populate heaven. And somewhere 
in between these angels and demons are those who have “in the depths of 
their being an ultimate interior openness to truth, to love, to God. In the 
27Catechism §1473. Also instructive in this connection is St Augustine’s distinc-
tion between the ‘remedial’ punishments of this life and of purgatory, suffered by 
those who haven’t completely subdued their carnal desires prior to the final judg-
ment, and the non-‘purgatorial’ or eternal punishments of the wicked following 
the final judgment in hell; see City of god XXI.13, 15–16.
28Catechism §1426, §1474.
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concrete choices of life, however, it is covered over by ever new compro-
mises with evil—much filth covers purity, but the thirst for purity remains 
and it still constantly re-emerges from all that is base and remains present 
in the soul.” For this batch there is purgatory, an intermediate state in 
which “purification and healing which mature the soul for communion 
with God” takes place. It is a “fire” through which they must pass “so 
as to become fully open to receiving God and able to take [their] place at 
the table of the eternal marriage-feast,” where the “fire” in question is, at 
its root, identical to the “gaze” and “the touch of [Christ’s] heart” which 
“heals us through an undeniably painful transformation” but which, “as it 
burns us, transforms and frees us, allowing us to become truly ourselves” 
and “thus totally of God.”29 So, to put the conclusion reached above a bit 
more inspiringly, purgatory is the purifying and transformative postmortem 
encounter with Christ which takes the broken and sick and heals them, making 
them fit to enjoy unsullied and unending communion with God and the saints in 
the life everlasting. That is what the Satisfaction Model says.
iV. objections and replies
I would like in this section to consider three objections, not so much to the 
Satisfaction Model itself, but rather to the suggestion that any Catholic 
thinker prior to, say, the mid-twentieth century actually thought of pur-
gatory that way. In a sense, of course, it doesn’t really make a difference, 
since once the terminology is understood as I’ve argued it should be, the 
model is easily seen to cohere with the terse and sketchy remarks about 
purgatory codified in the relevant documents antedating our time, so 
there isn’t any impediment to present-day Catholics accepting a position 
on purgatory which is identical in content to the Protestant position. But 
at least as regards my modest ecumenical hopes, it would still be nice to 
demonstrate that the Satisfaction Model I have described doesn’t amount 
to a shifty or disingenuous about-face on the part of contemporary Catho-
lics who might simply be trying through a clever redefinition of terms to 
distance themselves from the lurid ideas of their less sophisticated pre-
decessors. Perhaps more importantly, it seems reasonable to suspect that 
some of the practices and teachings related to the traditional doctrine of 
purgatory—e.g., the granting of indulgences for departed souls—conflict 
with what I’ve argued the point of purgatory really is on the Catholic ap-
proach. However, what I want to begin with is one difficulty for the Sat-
isfaction Model which does not connect with any controversial praxis or 
dogma but which is still worth pursuing because of its intrinsic interest. I 
have in mind the contention, voiced by St Bonaventure and probably as-
sumed by others, that souls in purgatory cannot sin.
The assumption is attractive: we don’t want souls in purgatory ret-
rogressing but continuing onward and upward, perhaps fueled by 
something akin to what Barnard terms the “internal momentum” which 
carries them inexorably toward their final sanctification.30 Additionally, 
the cessation of sin and continuous forward progression here imagined 
29Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Spe Salvi §§45–47. 
30Barnard, “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification,” p. 323.
180 Faith and Philosophy
may be thought to provide a salutary, merciful assurance to souls in 
purgatory that they’ll ultimately make it out on the right side of things, 
that their eventual salvation is guaranteed. Indeed, this appears to be 
the primary reason for which St Bonaventure insisted that souls in pur-
gatory couldn’t sin, so as to controvert the suggestion that uncertainty 
about their fate is one of the torments with which souls in purgatory are 
afflicted.31 Still, the obvious worry is that if souls in purgatory cannot 
sin, and if to be unable to sin is to be sanctified, and if to be sanctified is 
sufficient for getting out of purgatory and into heaven, then we have a 
contradiction on our hands. In particular, it looks as if the only business 
a sanctified soul could have in purgatory would be to suffer retributive 
pains for all the rotten things they had done in life, which runs against 
what I’ve said the purpose of purgatory is supposed to be.
So what to say? It seems to me that a person in purgatory may have 
certainty that he will ultimately be saved “as through fire” without its be-
ing the case that this certainty is grounded in introspective awareness of 
his inability to sin, together with an abductive inference to the effect that 
he must therefore be heaven-bound. (Why couldn’t God just relay his fate 
before sending him off to get purged, as in Newman’s Dream of Gerontius?) 
And I see no reason in the abstract why the trajectory of souls in purgatory 
couldn’t be characterized by a continual “upward trend” even if there are 
“dips” in the form of stumblings and sins, particularly sins of omission, 
along the way. Still, there is some plausibility to the thesis that among the 
helps God extends to people experiencing postmortem purgation is an 
impressive type of divine grace, which involves inter alia preserving them 
from falling into any further sin or “getting any worse.” But notice that 
even if this comforting proposal is correct it does not conflict with the con-
dition stipulating that souls in purgatory are not yet sanctified and thus 
does not contradict the Satisfaction Model. For to be providentially pre-
served from sinning is not equivalent to possessing a sanctified nature. If S 
possesses a sanctified nature, recall, it follows that conditionals of the form 
31See St Bonaventure’s remarks in St Roger Bellarmine, De Purgatorio IV, dist. 
20, p. 1, a. 1, q. iv, as cited in the Catholic Encyclopedia entry on “Purgatory,” http://
www.newadvent.org/cathen/12575a.htm. The thought that purgatorial afflictions 
include uncertainty as to the final deliverance of the soul is represented, for ex-
ample, in St John of the Cross: “This is the reason why those who lie in purgatory 
suffer great misgivings as to whether they will ever go forth from it and whether 
their pains will ever be over. For, although they have the habit of the three theo-
logical virtues—faith, hope and charity—the present realization which they have 
of their afflictions and of their deprivation of God allows them not to enjoy the 
present blessing and consolation of these virtues. For although they are able to 
realize that they have a great love for God . . . they cannot think that God loves 
them or that they are worthy that He should do so; rather, as they see that they are 
deprived of Him . . . they think that there is that in themselves which provides a 
very good reason why they should with perfect justice be abhorred and cast out 
by God forever. And thus, although the soul in this purgation is conscious that it 
has a great love for God . . . yet this is no relief to it, but rather brings it greater 
affliction . . . [when] it sees itself to be so wretched that it cannot believe that God 
loves it . . . [and] is grieved to see in itself reasons for deserving to be cast out by 
Him for Whom it has such great love and desire,” Dark Night of the Soul II.7, trans. 
E. Allison Peers (New York: Image Doubleday, 1990), pp. 113–114.
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“If S were in situation C, S would not sin” are necessarily true, true in all 
(nomologically) possible circumstances, whereas if S is simply preserved 
by divine grace from sinning it could be that there are many possible situ-
ations such that S would freely sin in them.32 Those, on this hypothesis, 
are the situations God sees to it S isn’t placed in while he’s working his 
way through purgatory. Thus one could agree with St Bonaventure that it 
isn’t possible for people in purgatory to sin while simultaneously holding 
that nobody in purgatory is already sanctified, since there is an acceptable 
sense in which both scenarios (the already-sanctified scenario and the spe-
cial-grace scenario) support the proposition that individuals in purgatory 
“cannot sin,” albeit in different ways.
Naturally, one wonders how genuinely conducive to spiritual fitness 
purgatory could be if things were “rigged” so that the souls there could do 
nothing at all to impede their own progress (even if they themselves might 
not know they couldn’t do this), but it seems to me too quick to infer that 
a purgatory like this couldn’t get the job done. To be sure, we may not be 
as inclined to applaud purgatory graduates here as we would if we knew 
there’d been a live possibility of regression or loss, and maybe we feel that 
the soul’s progress wouldn’t be all that laudable unless God were to back 
off a bit and let the soul more or less “go it alone.” But I think these intu-
itions tend to misdirect the judgment. For one thing, purgatory isn’t hap-
pily thought of as a ‘place’ for the acquisition of merit or the accumulation 
of accolades and rewards; the point is rather rehabilitation and growth, 
the eradication of dispositions to sin and the up-building and “setting” of 
dispositions toward holiness instead. And it isn’t at all obvious why this 
couldn’t take place unless God were prepared to disengage to the point of 
allowing souls in purgatory to bring genuine harm upon themselves or 
frustrate their own goals. Some analogies: the child’s father sees to it that 
she uses training wheels at the outset, but she still learns how to ride; the 
coach makes sure her gymnast invariably has someone around to spot 
him, but he eventually works up strength and poise sufficient to perform 
the acrobatics by himself; Barnum and Bailey insist that their neophyte 
trapezist always be hooked up to a harness, but only so that she stays alive 
and in one piece long enough to learn how to fly around the tent without 
it. These are only analogies; but the point behind them is not inapplicable 
to the case of interest.
So I see no reason to conclude that souls in purgatory couldn’t both be 
lapsable and be kept by God from damaging themselves further through 
fresh sin until they finally satisfy their temporal punishments and push 
on. But however that issue should be settled there remains a more serious 
question about the viability of my interpretation of the Satisfaction Model, 
and that is the question of how the practice of granting indulgences for 
the aid of souls in purgatory could be consistent with a view on which 
purgation is aimed at sanctification, not at “paybacks.” Because here is 
how things look: it looks as if the Pope is transferring a surplus of “merit” 
the Church has “stored up” and applying it to souls in purgatory with 
the intention of shortening their sentence or covering a portion of their 
32I note that the truth of this claim may depend upon the acceptance of Molin-
ism. Thanks to Tom Flint for calling this to my attention.
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remaining debts, which wouldn’t make sense unless these souls are being 
sent to purgatory for purely remunerative purposes after all. Now I have 
no present interest in defending the Catholic doctrine of indulgences, still 
less the unfortunate abuses for which this doctrine has provided occasion. 
But since it is reasonably clear that the Satisfaction Model really does say 
what I’ve said it does, and since it is equally clear that Catholics insist on 
making room for indulgences nevertheless, charity demands contemplat-
ing the possibility that there is some way to understand the granting of 
indulgences which renders it consistent with the Satisfaction Model.
As it happens one needn’t look far for the basic outlines of such an 
understanding. To begin, if we grant the supposition that prayers offered 
on another’s behalf can aid them in their sanctification while they are 
alive, then, inasmuch as the ties which “knit and bind” believers together 
in the “mystical body of Christ” cannot be broken by death, there is no 
principled reason to suppose that Christians cannot pray for the dead 
with the pious expectation that their prayers will make a difference to the 
purgatorial progress of the dearly departed.33 This I take it is something 
with which anyone who believes in purgatory, and who concedes the ef-
ficacy of prayer, could agree. But if obtaining indulgences on behalf of 
the dead may be seen as an extension of the practice of praying for their 
advancement in sanctification—if it’s motivated by the same convictions 
and anticipates the same results—then it follows that there is a way of un-
derstanding indulgences which is consistent with the Satisfaction Model. I 
am not, of course, claiming that anyone willing to countenance purgatory 
or praying for the deceased should ipso facto look favorably upon indul-
gences, or even that they shouldn’t be hostile to the very idea of them. I am 
claiming that if there is a consistent set S of ecclesiological-cum-theological 
propositions such that S conjoined with the Satisfaction Model yields the 
possibility of granting or obtaining efficacious indulgences for the dead, 
then this practice is not inconsistent with the Satisfaction Model, regardless 
of whether the propositions in S are true or whether they’re totally off the 
mark. To rephrase, my interest here is in whether Catholic belief concern-
ing indulgences contradicts my understanding of the Satisfaction Model 
and thus disproves my contention that the theory of purgatory I’ve attrib-
uted to Catholicism is equivalent to the Sanctification Model; whether the 
doctrine of indulgences is actually true (or for that matter whether there’s 
actually a purgatory containing souls to be indulged in the first place) is a 
question well beyond the scope of this paper.
In that spirit, then, consider Pope John Paul II’s explanation of the 
Catholic Church’s indulgence-granting behavior. Note first that the con-
ception of purgatory with which he operates is identical to the one I have 
adumbrated above: the purpose of purgatory derives from the fact that 
although the believer is already reconciled with God he still “must be 
gradually ‘healed’ of the negative effects which sin has caused in him 
33And, for that matter, there’s no reason to think departed souls couldn’t return 
the favor. So St Augustine, City of god XX.9. I realize of course that the efficacy of 
petitionary prayer, (this understanding of) the communion of the saints, and the 
existence of purgatory are all controversial assumptions. I myself am prepared to 
accept them, but all I ask of my readers is to allow them for the sake of discussion.
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(what the theological tradition calls the ‘punishments’ and ‘remains’ of 
sin)” prior to entering heaven, because communion with God requires 
that every “imperfection of the soul must be corrected” by Christ, who 
“removes from [souls in purgatory] the remnants of imperfection” in 
preparation for their heavenly reception. Accordingly, as above, the ‘tem-
poral punishment’ a person suffers in purgatory “serves as a ‘medicine’ 
to the extent that the person allows it to challenge him to undertake his 
own profound conversion,” which is at bottom “the meaning of the ‘sat-
isfaction’ required” of him before he attains to the beatific vision.34 With 
this framework in place, the teaching on indulgences takes shape under 
the following two assumptions. First there is the conviction, previously 
voiced, that just “as in their earthly life believers are united in the one 
Mystical Body, so after death those who live in a state of purification [i.e., 
purgatory] experience the same ecclesial solidarity” they enjoyed during 
their tenure on earth, from which it follows that believers still undergo-
ing their earthly pilgrimage may “offer up prayers and good works on 
behalf of [their] brothers and sisters in Purgatory.”35 Second, there is the 
(no doubt more contentious) belief that under certain carefully specified 
conditions, the Church has the power to grant “a remission before God 
of the temporal punishment due to sins whose guilt has already been 
forgiven.” On this picture, then, the Church’s intercessory power makes 
it possible to assist souls in purgatory by advancing their sanctification in 
special, nonstandard ways, but nonetheless in ways that do not differ in 
kind from praying for them, and thus do not involve anything on the order 
of a forensic transaction absolving them of accumulated penalties or fines. 
Here is John Paul II:
The Church has a treasury . . . which is “dispensed” as it were through 
indulgences. This “distribution” should not be understood as a sort 
of automatic transfer, as if we were speaking of “things.” It is instead 
the expression of the Church’s full confidence of being heard by the 
Father when . . . she asks him to mitigate or cancel the painful aspect 
of punishment by fostering its medicinal aspect through other chan-
nels of grace. In the unfathomable mystery of divine wisdom, this 
gift of intercession can also benefit the faithful departed, who receive 
its fruits in a way appropriate to their condition. We can see, then, 
how indulgences, far from being a sort of “discount” on the duty of 
conversion, are instead an aid to its prompt generous and radical 
fulfillment.36
Now whatever exactly one thinks about the distinctively Catholic eccle-
siology underlying these claims, it is undeniably clear that insofar as these 
ecclesiological claims are accepted there is no conflict between belief in the 
efficacy of indulgences on the one hand and, on the other, the thesis that 
purgatory’s exclusive purpose is to transform the lapsable into the sanctified. In 
34Pope John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday, 29 September 1999, §§2–3.
35Pope John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday, 4 August 1999, §6.
36Pope John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday, 29 September 1999, §4.
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other words, there is a way of understanding indulgences for the dead 
(which, if John Paul II may serve as representative, isn’t too far removed 
from how Catholics do understand indulgences) that is consistent with 
the Satisfaction Model of purgatory as I’ve laid it out. Unquestionably, it 
remains “unfathomably mysterious” how exactly the ‘medicinal’ feature 
of temporal punishments is supposed to be administered through an al-
ternative “channel of grace” which brings about the desired sanctifying 
effect without the typical associated pains. But mystery isn’t equivalent to 
inconsistency. And since my ambitions in this paper do not include trying 
to eradicate mysteries like this one, I am satisfied with the result that, mys-
terious or no, the doctrine of indulgences does not undermine my claim 
that the Satisfaction Model and the Sanctification Model may properly be 
considered one and the same.
One final concern should be addressed. If the Satisfaction Model truly 
is a “forward looking” theory oriented toward rehabilitation, sanctifica-
tion and the like, what accounts for all the ideas about flames and tor-
ments and agonizing tortures and whatever else contributes to making the 
atmosphere of purgatory generally unpleasant? Aren’t these assumptions 
concerning how much it hurts to get ‘purged’ much easier to reconcile 
with a view on which purgatory is more or less a temporary taste of hell, 
a place for people to go if they do not quite deserve to be consigned to 
the flames forever, but who do not deserve to pass into heaven entirely 
unscathed? And doesn’t that suggest that my thesis is false, that the Satis-
faction Model really is just about vindictive retributions after all?
Much could be said about the pain associated with purgation, and cer-
tainly much more than what I have the space37 to say it in. For the present, 
then, I shall leave the task of responding to this question in the hands of St 
Catherine of Genoa, whose suggestive remarks about the pains of purga-
tory (circa 1490, about 50 years after the Council of Florence) seem a fitting 
way to pull together this article’s main themes:
The basis of all the pains [of purgatory] is sin, whether original or ac-
tual. God created the soul pure, simple and clean from all stain of sin, 
with a beatific instinct towards the one from whom original sin, in 
which the soul presently finds itself, draws it away. When actual sin 
is added to this original sin, the soul is drawn still further from him. 
. . . When a soul draws near to the pure and clear state in which it 
was at its first creation, its beatific instinct is rediscovered and grows 
continually stronger with such force that any obstacle preventing 
the soul from finally reaching its goal appears to be unbearable. The 
more it glimpses this vision, the greater its pain. Because the souls in 
purgatory are without the guilt of sin, there is no obstacle between 
them and God except their pain, which holds them back so that they 
cannot reach perfection through this instinct. They can also see that 
this instinct is held back by a need for righteousness. For this reason, 
a fierce fire . . . comes into being, which is like that of Hell, with the 
37To say nothing of the competence; why “the flame of Everlasting Love / doth 
burn ere it transform,” as Newman puts it, seems to me a question better left to 
the mystics.
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exception of guilt. . . . And as for guilt, these souls are just as they 
were when they were originally created by God, in that God forgives 
immediately the guilt of those who have passed from this life dis-
tressed by their sins, and having confessed them and resolved not to 
commit them anymore. Only the corrosion of sin is left, and they are 
cleansed from this by pain in the fire. When they have been cleansed 
for all guilt, and united in their wills with God, they may see him 
clearly (to the extent that he makes himself known to them), and see 
also how much it means to enjoy him, which is the goal for which 
they have been created.38
If we take into account St Catherine’s insights, the painfulness of purga-
tory need not be taken as proof that its purpose on the Satisfaction Model 
differs from the point of purgation on the Sanctification approach. Indeed, 
St Catherine’s remarks make it abundantly clear that the Protestant ver-
sion of purgatory recently put forward in this Journal has been anticipated 
within the Catholic tradition centuries before this one, even if it has at 
times been differently expressed. Therefore, neither the existence of pur-
gatory nor the purpose behind it constitutes an authentic point of division 
between Catholics and those Protestants who accept its reality.39
the university of oklahoma
38St Catherine of Genoa, Treatise on Purgatory III.5, in the Christian theology 
Reader, ed. Alister McGrath (Blackwell: Oxford, 1995), p. 360.
39Thanks to Tom Flint and two anonymous referees for their helpful remarks on 
a previous draft of this paper.
